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INTRODUCTION 
It may be bordering on apostasy in certain circles to suggest that 
Knick v. Township of Scott1 — in which a sharply divided Supreme 
Court held that municipal and local governments may be sued in 
 
* Robert H. Thomas is the Joseph T. Waldo Visiting Chair in Property Rights Law at 
William & Mary Law School, and practices with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert 
in Honolulu, Hawaii. He writes about takings and property law at 
inversecondemnation.com. 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
510 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
federal court to recover just compensation for Fifth Amendment 
regulatory takings2 — is a ruling that municipalities could celebrate.  
After all, how could a decision that overruled a case that for more than 
three decades had effectively shut federal takings claimants out of 
federal court by relegating them to (presumably) more local 
government-friendly state courts be a good thing for local 
governments? 
The Knick majority concluded that a federal regulatory takings 
claim is ripe for federal court review from the moment a municipality 
adopts an allegedly confiscatory regulation without providing 
compensation, even if a state court would also entertain a state law 
takings or inverse condemnation claim.3  The reason why local 
governments should look for a silver lining in the majority ruling is the 
unstated premise which all the justices confronted: Are local 
governments merely conveniences of the state, or are they separate 
from the state and its judiciary?  This Article suggests that the answer 
to that question is the latter — state courts resolving state law inverse 
condemnation and state takings claims are not part of a local 
government’s taking and compensation mechanism. 
First, Part I of this Article summarizes the nature of a regulatory 
takings claim and explains the rationale which the Supreme Court 
crafted in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City to conclude that federal regulatory 
takings claims were not ripe for federal court review until a state court 
rejected a property owner’s pursuit of compensation through state 
procedures.4  Part I also describes how the state procedures 
requirement and preclusion rules were employed to catch property 
owners in a trap in which their federal takings claims were deemed to 
be either too early or too late.  Second, Part II analyzes the Knick 
decision and the majority and dissent’s rationales, and focuses on the 
critical — but unstated — rationale at the center of the Court’s debate.  
Finally, the Article concludes by arguing that reopening the federal 
courthouse doors to federal takings claims without the need to first 
pursue state remedies is supported by a strong view of municipal home 
rule and autonomy. 
 
 2. Id. at 2168 (property owner “may bring his claim in federal court under [42 
U.S.C.] § 1983 at that time”). 
 3. Id. at 2167 (“We now concluded that the state-litigation requirement imposes 
an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings 
jurisprudence, and must be overruled.”). 
 4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
2020] SUBLIMATING MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 511 
I. TAKINGS, EXHAUSTION, PRECLUSION, AND REMOVAL 
This Part of the Article summarizes the nature of a federal takings 
claim, how the Court in Williamson County adopted the state 
procedures requirement with little briefing (and none of the usual 
percolation of issues), and how two subsequent decisions magnified 
Williamson County’s inherent unfairness. 
A. Mahon: An Old Idea Renewed 
This section briefly explains the nature of a regulatory takings claim 
and the rationale the Court created in Williamson County to justify the 
state procedures requirement, purportedly based on the text of the 
Fifth Amendment, but in reality, manufactured from whole cloth by 
the Court. 
A federal regulatory takings claim5 is the idea, first articulated in the 
modern era in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 that if a regulation 
goes “too far” in restricting the owner’s use of property, it is the 
functional equivalent of an exercise of eminent domain and will be 
recognized as a taking, for which the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments mandate the payment of compensation.  While Mahon is 
often cited as the first takings case,7 the idea that an exercise of 
governmental power other than the eminent domain power could 
trigger an obligation to provide an affected property owner 
compensation was a long-standing principle of the common law.8  In 
short, if a local government’s regulation restricts an owner’s use 
severely, it is, from the owner’s viewpoint, no different than a seizure 
of property by eminent domain.9  Since 1897, state and local 
governments have been — by virtue of incorporation of the Fifth 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 6. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”). 
 7. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in 
Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 43–44 (2014). 
 8. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Newbergh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) 
(Kent, J.) (municipality required to compensate riparian property owner before it 
rerouted the stream away from the owner’s land by ordinance); see also In re The 
King’s Prerogative in Saltpeter, 12 Coke R. 13, 14 (1606) (The King’s agents may take 
saltpeter, but “[t]hey ought to make the Places, in which they dig, so well and 
commodious to the Owner as they were before.”). 
 9. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005) (the takings inquiry 
is designed “to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to 
government appropriation or invasion of private property”). 
512 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
Amendment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
— subject to the just compensation imperative.10  For more than 60 
years after Mahon, there was not a serious question that a federal claim 
for compensation could be asserted against local governments by 
property owners in federal court.  As a result, federal courts routinely 
resolved these cases. 
B. Williamson County: The Supreme Court Makes Up the State 
Procedures Requirement 
In 1985, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,11 the Court — mostly out of nowhere, 
as neither the court below nor the parties had argued for it — adopted 
two procedural prerequisites owners had to show before a federal 
takings claim was considered ripe for federal court.  First, the 
regulating agency had to make the final decision on what uses are 
allowed under the regulation.12  If the agency’s process is ongoing, 
there is no way for a reviewing court to tell what uses of the property 
remain.  This is known as the “final decision” requirement.13  Second, 
 
 10. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–
34 (1897). 
 11. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 12. Id. at 186 (“As the court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim that 
the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not 
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has 
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at 
issue.”). 
 13. The “final decision” referenced by the Court not only includes a decision by the 
local government applying the regulation to the property, but also what the Court 
called a “variance.” Id. at 187–88 (“But, like the Hodel plaintiffs, respondent did not 
then seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its 
proposed plat, notwithstanding the Commission’s finding that the plat did not comply 
with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations.”). As anyone familiar with land 
use law will say, however, a variance is not simply a request for reconsideration, but is 
only available in limited circumstances where the denial of an application will result in 
severe and “unnecessary” hardship on the applicant. See, e.g., Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 
N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939); Surfrider Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 358 P.3d 664, 
676 (Haw. 2015). A variance permits a local zoning authority to allow a requested use 
or design that is otherwise prohibited and has been described as a “safety valve” to 
relieve hardship on a property owner that might be caused by strict application of 
zoning restrictions. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The 
Variance in Zoning and Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 307, 308 (1995). A general rule, after all, cannot account for all 
circumstances, and there may be instances where applying the rule to a particular 
parcel would create unfair hardship. See, e.g., Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple 
of Haw. v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Haw. 1998) (owner argued that strict 
application of building height limit worked as a hardship). Variances are also safety 
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the owner must not only have been denied compensation by the local 
government, but she must also have sued the local government in state 
court for inverse condemnation to try and force it to pay compensation 
for the regulatory taking under state law.14 
In what became known as the “state-litigation” or “state 
procedures” requirement, the Williamson County Court reasoned that 
the Fifth Amendment only makes a taking of property “without just 
compensation” unconstitutional.15  The majority based its conclusion 
on the text of the Just Compensation Clause: “[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”16  The 
Court also referenced a touchstone of eminent domain law, that “the 
Fifth Amendment [does not] require that just compensation be paid in 
advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking: all that is required 
is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining 
compensation’ exist at the time of the taking.”17  This principle, which 
allows the federal government to “take now, pay later,” would become 
a key point of debate between the Knick majority and dissenters.18  The 
Williamson County Court ultimately held that Tennessee courts would 
entertain an inverse condemnation lawsuit under a state statute, and, 
conflating local governments with “the State,” held that a state-law 
inverse condemnation lawsuit, prosecuted in state court, was a 
reasonable, certain, and adequate process to secure compensation.19  
The owner must both pursue a lawsuit — and lose it — before the 
federal takings claims ripened.20  The Court reasoned that because the 
 
valves for the government since they are a takings avoidance mechanism, which allows 
development in lieu of a takings judgment when denial of permission to build would 
be a taking. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 297 (1981) (takings claim not ripe until owner has sought variance). 
 14. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (“A second reason the taking claim is not yet 
ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State 
has provided for doing so.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297 n.40 (1981). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 17. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 
419 U.S. 102, 124–25 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 
659 (1890))). 
 18. Compare Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019) (“The Fifth 
Amendment right to full compensation arises at the time of the taking, regardless of 
post-taking remedies that may be available to the property owner.”), with id. at 2181 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority today holds, in conflict with precedent after 
precedent, that a government violates the Constitution whenever it takes property 
without advance compensation — no matter how good its commitment to pay.”). 
 19. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 196. 
 20. Id. (“The Tennessee state courts have interpreted § 29-16-123 to allow recovery 
through inverse condemnation where the ‘taking’ is effected by restrictive zoning laws 
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local government had not yet actually “denied” compensation until it 
lost the owner’s state court lawsuit to recover compensation, the 
constitutional wrong had not occurred until the state supreme court 
ruled in the government’s favor that no compensation was owed.21  
Only then was a taking “without just compensation,” and a federal 
takings claim substantively ripe for federal court consideration.22 
To characterize this rationale as facile and recursive would be an 
understatement.  In nearly every circumstance, the local government 
had, almost by definition, already “denied” owing compensation, 
either by not affirmatively providing for compensation in the allegedly 
offending regulation itself or by disclaiming Fifth Amendment liability 
in response to an owner’s pre-lawsuit demand.  The government’s 
position in nearly every regulatory takings case, after all, is that it is 
merely regulating property under its police or other regulatory power 
— not taking it by eminent domain.  Thus, it should have surprised no 
one that these regulations rarely if ever acknowledged the obligation 
to provide compensation.  This convoluted logic resulted in 
commentators beginning to take apart Williamson County’s rationale 
and its stretching of the constitutional text almost immediately after 
the Court issued the opinion.23 
The Court’s analysis in Williamson County was easily subject to 
attack because the Court based its holding on ripeness even though 
none of the parties raised or briefed it.  The parties disputed whether a 
restriction on the use of property that is eventually lifted could be a 
temporary taking requiring compensation (an issue later resolved by 
the Court positively in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
Los Angeles County).24  The U.S. Solicitor General, however, as 
amicus curiae argued that federal courts could not even hear a federal 
claim for compensation (permanent, temporary, or otherwise) until the 
 
or development regulations.” (citing Davis v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 620 S.W.2d 
532, 533–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Speight v. Lockhart, 524 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1975))). 
 21. Id. at 186. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The figurative ink was not dry on the opinion when commentators began 
immediately blasting the Court’s rationale. The first in a long line of scholarly attacks 
on the case was Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 39, 39–40 (1985) (“[Williamson County] takes its place in the pantheon 
of indecision . . . as demonstrating that those learned in the ways of the law can always 
find a way to duck an issue. With all due respect, the . . . non-decision is both bad law 
and bad government.”). 
 24. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 
304, 312 (1987) (compensation is an available remedy for a temporary taking, and an 
owner is not limited to seeking invalidation of the regulation). 
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owner either lost a state law inverse claim in her state’s highest court 
or could show that the remedy was not available under state law.25  The 
Court latched on to that argument and adopted it as a virtual wall 
around the federal courts for federal takings claims. 
The Court ventured into unchartered waters when it relied on two 
Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions to support the conclusion that a 
property owner could seek — and presumably in the right 
circumstances recover — just compensation for a regulatory taking in 
an inverse condemnation lawsuit.26  The problem was that the only 
Tennessee court that mattered — the Tennessee Supreme Court — 
had actually not interpreted the statute that way and would not do so 
for another three decades.  Indeed, at the time of Williamson County, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court expressly limited recovery of 
compensation under the statute to physical occupation and “nuisance-
type” takings, as it later recognized: 
It is true that until today this Court has recognized only physical 
occupation takings and nuisance-type takings . . . . We hold that, like 
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, article I, section 
21 of the Tennessee Constitution encompasses regulatory takings and 
that the Property Owners’ complaint is sufficient to allege a state 
constitutional regulatory taking claim, for which they may seek 
compensation under Tennessee’s inverse condemnation statute, 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-123.27 
In short, the Williamson County Court was flatly wrong when it 
concluded the property owner could pursue a compensation remedy in 
a Tennessee court for a regulatory taking under state law, and 
therefore was required to do so. 
 
 25. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. 172 (No. 84-4) (“The viability of respondent’s taking claim 
in federal court is further undermined by respondent’s failure to seek judicial review 
in state court of the Commission’s disapproval of its preliminary plat in June 1981. If, 
as it appears, there was an available state procedure for obtaining such review, then 
the Commission’s decision did not under state law constitute a final rejection by the 
State of respondent’s claim of a right to develop its property in conformity with its 
submission.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 
2174 (2019) (“As amicus curiae in support of the local government, the United States 
argued in this Court that the developer could not state a Fifth Amendment claim 
because it had not pursued an inverse condemnation suit in state court. Neither party 
had raised that argument before.” (footnote omitted)). 
 26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 27. Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243–45 (Tenn. 2014); see also 
id. at 242 (issue of whether compensation under the inverse condemnation statute was 
available for regulatory takings claims was “an issue of first impression for this Court”). 
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But despite its faulty foundation, Williamson County was the law, 
and local governments had a very potent tool in its quiver.  Legal 
scholars who supported the Williamson County state-procedures rule 
(or, more accurately, the limitations it placed on property owners’ 
rights) began searching for rationales to justify it (for example, through 
comity, federalism,28 and even textualism).29  Nevertheless, for the next 
three decades, the deconstruction of the case and its rationale by the 
property bar and much of the legal academy continued unabated.30 
C. The San Remo Preclusion Trap 
The questionable rationale of Williamson County was dramatically 
laid bare in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,31 
where the Court took Williamson County’s flawed logic to its 
inevitable end.  There, the Court endorsed a “you’re either too early, 
or you’re too late” theory.  In essence, the very process by which an 
owner ripened a federal takings claim — chasing and eventually losing 
a state law inverse condemnation lawsuit in state court — also meant 
that when the owner later asserted a ripened federal takings claim in 
federal court, that claim would be deemed precluded by the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.32  Federal courts owe state judgments the same 
respect they would be given in state court, and that includes the effects 
of the state’s law of claim and issue preclusion.33  Resolving the state 
inverse claim as Williamson County required meant that a property 
owner had also thereby litigated her future unripe federal takings claim 
(even where she expressly tried not to do so).34  And, because a state 
court would consider a subsequent federal takings claim precluded by 
litigation of a state inverse condemnation claim, so must the federal 
court as a matter of full faith and credit.35 
 
 28. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004). 
 29. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying a Prudential Solution to the 
Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 176–77 (2014). 
 30. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 251, 284–300 (2006). 
 31. 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 32. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and the Full Faith 
and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), require that federal courts give judgments 
of state courts the same effect they would have in state court. 
 33. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–46. 
 34. Nor could an England reservation avoid the preclusion trap. See England v. La. 
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 428 (1964) (in state courts, a plaintiff may 
expressly “reserve” federal issues, and doing so avoids a later claim that the federal 
issue was litigated in state court). 
 35. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345. 
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The short story was that if a property owner filed a federal takings 
claim in federal court without first having lost in state court, the owner 
was deemed to be too early under Williamson County’s state 
procedures requirement.  But if the owner followed Williamson 
County’s rule and went through the state law process and lost the claim 
for compensation, the owner would be barred by preclusion principles 
from “relitigating” in federal court his federal takings claim, even 
though he had never actually litigated that issue. 
The Catch-22 nature of this prompted four justices to note in San 
Remo that the Williamson County rationale was due for a second look.  
(A first look, actually, since the question was never actually litigated 
by the parties in Williamson County.)  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
Finally, Williamson County’s state-litigation rule has created some 
real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue . . . . I joined the 
opinion of the Court in Williamson County.  But further reflection 
and experience lead me to think that the justifications for its state-
litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings 
plaintiffs is dramatic . . . . In an appropriate case, I believe the Court 
should reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment 
takings claim based on the final decision of a state or local 
government entity must first seek compensation in state courts.36 
The four concurring justices in San Remo were not interested in 
revisiting Williamson County, however, because the property owners 
had not asked them to (although that did not stop the Court in 
Williamson County from adopting a rule sue sponte, so it is unclear 
what spurred the hesitation in San Remo).37 
D. International College: The State Procedures Requirement Hits 
Rock Bottom 
In 1997, the Supreme Court completed the ripeness anomaly hat 
trick.  In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, the 
Court did not bat an eye when a local government defendant removed 
the plaintiff’s federal takings claim from state to federal court under 
 
 36. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 351–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 37. An exchange in the San Remo oral arguments with Justice O’Connor went like 
this: 
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: And you haven’t asked us to revisit that Williamson 
County case, have you? 
MR. UTRECHT: We have not asked that this Court reconsider the decision 
in Williamson County. 
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: Maybe you should have. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323 (No. 04-340). 
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federal question “arising under” jurisdiction. 38  The plaintiff raised a 
state law claim in state court (as Williamson County required it do).39  
How could the municipality remove a case where under the “state 
litigation” requirement, the federal constitutional issue was not ripe 
because the state litigation had not resulted in a denial of 
compensation?  The answer to this question is not clear, as the Court 
provided no answer. 
This resulted in the asymmetry where a federal regulatory takings 
plaintiff could not bring a case in federal court, but a local government 
(or state defendant if it was willing to waive its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity) could remove the state court lawsuit to federal court 
because the federal claim originally could have been brought there 
(even though technically under Williamson County, it could not).  In a 
few of the more extreme examples of this anomaly, some courts did not 
blink when the local government defendant — which had removed the 
case to federal court — then sought dismissal of the takings claim on 
the grounds that the federal takings claims were not ripe because the 
state courts had not yet rejected the owner’s claim for compensation.  
The reason why the state courts had not denied the plaintiff’s state law 
claim for compensation was because the defendant had removed the 
case to federal court.  Several courts rejected this sleight-of-hand, in 
some cases even sanctioning the government for having spoken out of 
both sides of its mouth.40 
But many courts paid no mind at all.  Warner v. City of Marathon41 
exemplifies these latter cases.  There, Florida property owners raised a 
regulatory takings claim in Florida state court42 — a prudent move, 
given Williamson County.  The city removed the case as a federal 
question, exercising its International College power.43  The district 
court dismissed the case as unripe under Williamson County’s state 
procedures requirement, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  Wait a 
minute, the property owner argued, we did what the Supreme Court in 
 
 38. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 39. Id. at 160. 
 40. See, e.g., Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1110 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (city removed case to federal court, and on the eve of trial sought a remand 
under Williamson County; the court rejected the argument, concluding, “the City 
having invoked federal jurisdiction, its effort to multiply these proceedings by a 
remand to state court smacks of bad faith”); see also Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 
F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2014); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544–47 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Key Outdoor Inc. v. City of Galesburg, 327 F.3d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 41. Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 Fed. App’x. 834 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 42. Id. at 836. 
 43. See id. 
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Williamson County told us we had to do: We brought our state law 
takings claim in a Florida court, asking for compensation through 
available procedures, so we’re not here in federal court willingly.  We 
were in the process of ripening our federal claim in state court when 
the city removed us to federal court.  But the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
that argument, concluding the case was not ripe because the property 
owners had not secured a denial of their compensation claim by the 
state court: 
The plaintiffs also did not allege in their complaint that they availed 
themselves of this remedy and were denied relief.  Instead, the 
plaintiffs seem to assert on appeal that the takings claim presented in 
their complaint is their just compensation claim.  Notwithstanding the 
possibility that they were attempting to assert an inverse 
condemnation claim in Florida state court before the case was 
removed to federal court, we cannot review the claim until the 
plaintiffs have been denied relief by a Florida court.44 
Just how were the plaintiffs in Warner supposed to have sought and 
be denied compensation in state court when the city removed the case 
midstream, before they could pursue and obtain a ruling there?  
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (without prejudice), 
which effectively served as a remand order of the city’s removal.45  
Thus, the case returned to state court.  Although the property owner 
lost time (and attorneys’ fees), it at least did not suffer the indignity of 
a dismissal with prejudice.  Even so, the case highlights the foolishness 
that Williamson County’s state procedures requirement spawned: If 
the plaintiffs went back to state court (where they were originally) and 
filed a new suit against the city, what would prevent the city from 
removing it yet again?  While extreme, this case is just one example of 
the very real problems that Williamson County enabled.46 
 
 44. Id. at 838. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See also, e.g., Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 903–04 (8th Cir. 
2006); Sandy Creek Inv’rs, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(dismissing the case on appeal because the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
resolve takings claims that were removed from state court); Ohad Assocs., LLC v. 
Township of Marlboro, No. CV 10-2183 (AET), 2011 WL 310708, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 
28, 2011); 8679 Trout, LLC v. N. Tahoe Pub. Utils. Dist., No. 2:10-cv-01569-MCE-EFB, 
2010 WL 3521952, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010); Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v. 
County of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Rau v. City of 
Garden Plain, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174–75 (D. Kan. 1999) (recognizing the incoherent 
application of the Williamson County state litigation requirement and remanding a 
removed case to state court rather than dismiss the takings claims). 
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E. Takings Litigation Devolves into Dickensian Dystopia 
To a lawyer or legal scholar’s eyes, Williamson County’s state 
procedures requirement might charitably be called opaque.  But when 
coupled with the you’re-either-too-early-or-you’re-too-late trap 
endorsed by San Remo and the unilateral removal power of 
International College, to property owners who needlessly must have 
budgeted years of legal fees if they wanted to even think about ripening 
a federal constitutional takings claim for federal court, it became 
maddeningly dense.  It erected a nearly impossible-to-overcome hurdle 
for anyone who desired to vindicate their federal constitutional 
property rights in a federal forum.47 
In theory, of course, a property owner who possessed the dual 
luxuries of time and a thick wallet could do what the Court 
contemplated: after the local government’s position was fixed, the 
owner could ask the government for compensation, be denied, and 
then sue the government in state court to force the government to 
recognize its obligation to pay compensation under state law.48  When, 
presumably, years later, the owner eventually lost that claim — thus 
ripening the federal takings claim because the local government had 
finally taken the property “without just compensation” — the owner 
could then bring a complaint in federal court.49 
However, as a practical and procedural matter, owners never got 
anywhere close to successfully running Williamson County’s gauntlet, 
and the substantive ripeness of the “state procedures” rationale 
amounted to a requirement for a property owner to exhaust state 
remedies.  No other federal civil rights plaintiff alleging a violation of 
her federal constitutional rights by local governments had to adhere to 
this requirement.  Thus, even a monkey — a monkey! — had the keys 
to the federal courthouse door to assert its property rights in a 
“selfie.”50  Federal courts regularly entertained cases about whether — 
contrary to Chris Rock’s dictum — something untoward really might 
 
 47. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in 
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 103 (2000) (“Ripeness rules are used 
as an offensive weapon to delay litigation, increase both fiscal and emotional costs to 
the property owner, and convince potential plaintiffs that they should not even try to 
‘fight city hall.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 48. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). 
 49. See id. at 194. 
 50. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 424, 426 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding Naruto, a 
crested macaque, has Article III standing, but no standing under the Copyright Act). 
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be going on in the Champagne Room.51  A local law interfered with a 
desire to create Valentine’s Day artwork out of the plaintiffs’ nude 
bodies?  Go straight to federal court, no questions asked.52  City animal 
control officers took a homeless man’s 18 diseased pigeons, pet crow, 
and seagull?  Go straight to federal court, too — just be sure to couch 
the claim as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth.53  But 
if a state or local government infringed on a Fifth Amendment 
property right?  Go to state court and stay there.  For more than 30 
years, as a consequence of Williamson County’s state procedures 
requirement and San Remo’s preclusion trap, federal courts simply did 
not deign to “do” takings, unless the local government decided to 
remove it from state to federal court under International College.54 
As a result, for 30-plus years, property owners, their lawyers, legal 
scholars, and the courts struggled.  State court judges got a real 
education in federal takings law, but the only hope of having a federal 
court consider a federal takings claim was the thin reed of the Supreme 
Court exercising certiorari to review a state supreme court’s judgment.  
However, that is a notoriously thin reed.  Of course, there were some 
efforts to limit the bite of the ripeness doctrine.  For example, sensing 
the injustice of singling-out federal property claims for exclusion from 
federal courts, some lower courts treated Williamson County’s state-
procedures ripeness rule as not jurisdictional, but merely a 
“prudential” requirement; a rule a federal court could overlook if it 
wanted to hear the case.55  Case-by-case federal jurisdiction is not 
exactly the best circumstance to promote certainty, regularity, and 
predictability, though.  However, a huge percentage of property 
owners who were not willing to pay their lawyers to contribute 
materials for Federal Courts treatises or otherwise endure years of 
pointless procedural wrangling declined to pursue their rights or ended 
up throwing in the towel midstream. 
The Sixth Circuit summed up well the odyssey on which property 
owners were required to embark: 
[I]t is obvious to us that, left to the devices of the Village’s counsel, 
this case will become another Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, with the 
 
 51. See, e.g., Flanigan’s Enters. v. Fulton County, 596 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 
2010) (challenging ordinance prohibiting alcohol sales at nude dancing 
establishments). 
 52. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007). 
 53. See Recchia v. City of L.A. Dep’t of Animal Servs., 889 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 54. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 157 (1997). 
 55. See, e.g., Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 390 (2019). 
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participants “mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages of an 
endless cause, tripping one another up on slippery precedents, 
groping knee-deep in technicalities, running their . . . heads against 
walls of words, and making a pretense of equity . . . .”  For nearly ten 
years, the Kruses have endeavored to vindicate their property rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and by state statutes.  The Village’s 
actions threaten to turn the Kruse family into generations of “ruined 
suitors” pursuing legal redress in a system “which gives to monied 
might, the means abundantly of wearying out the right; which so 
exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope” as to leave them 
“perennially hopeless.”  Enough is enough, and then some.56 
Williamson County’s state procedures exhaustion requirement 
certainly could not have been intended to be simply a tool to financially 
bleed out property owners by running them through a time-consuming 
and ultimately pointless maze — a “procedural monster.”57 
One additional dynamic contributed to the chaos.  As noted above, 
the Supreme Court adopted the state-litigation rule without the benefit 
of party briefing or argument, and without a developed body of 
scholarly work as a foundation.58  In doing so, it reversed the usual 
process of getting an issue up to the Supreme Court.  Generally, issues 
contentious enough to merit high court review are most often allowed 
— even required — to “percolate” for years in the lower courts and law 
journals, before the Court is ready to take the issue up.  That way, there 
is a developed body of lower court decisions and scholarly analysis for 
the Court to consider.  Thus, in Supreme Court litigation, it is often 
better to be a later case to present an issue, not the first.  That way, the 
Court can consider the question presented after an appropriate study 
by bench, academy, and bar.  Williamson County, however, flipped that 
usual script: the Court adopted the state-litigation requirement on its 
own.59  Only after the Court imposed the rule did the bar and the 
academy start to debate whether requiring a property owner to exhaust 
state law procedures to ripen a federal takings claim was consistent 
with the Fifth Amendment or was otherwise justifiable.  Moreover, we 
spent the next 30-plus years doing so.  Ironically, only in Knick did the 
Court finally get a full briefing on the issue. 
 
 56. Kruse v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford U. Press ed. 1989)). 
 57. See Berger, supra note 47, at 102 (Williamson County transformed “the 
ripeness doctrine from a minor anomaly into a procedural monster”). 
 58. See Brief for the United States, supra note 25. 
 59. See id. 
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II. KNICK REOPENED THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS 
This Part summarizes the Knick majority and dissenting opinions, 
and focuses on their critical — but unstated — assumptions about the 
nature of local government, and their relationship to state courts and 
state inverse condemnation claims. 
A. Rose Mary Knick: Ghostbuster 
The Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, apparently has a problem with 
unregulated cemeteries.  So, it did what local governments do when 
they think they have a problem — it passed a law.  That law, Ordinance 
12-12-20-001, required owners of all cemeteries, public or private, to 
maintain them.60  The ordinance also contained two troublesome 
provisions.  First, it required the owners of the cemeteries to keep them 
open to the public during the day.61  Second, it allowed the Township’s 
code inspectors to enter “any property” to inspect and determine 
whether it complies with the ordinance.62  Under the authority of the 
ordinance, a code inspector came on Rose Mary Knick’s property 
without a warrant and informed her that the Township believed that 
an open field on her land was home to an old cemetery.63  She 
disagreed.  The inspector wrote her up for violating the ordinance.64 
In Knick v. Township of Scott, Knick sued in Pennsylvania state 
court, seeking to enjoin the enforcement action.65  In response, the 
Township withdrew the notice of violation, and the parties agreed to 
stay enforcement actions.66  But Knick did not include an inverse 
condemnation claim or any other claim for compensation in her state 
court challenge.67  After the Township issued a second notice of 
violation of the ordinance and the state court denied Knick’s request 
for a contempt order, she sued in federal court, asserting a violation of 
her Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless searches, and her 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and just 
compensation.68  After some back-and-forth on the contents of the 
 
 60. Scott Township, Pa., Ordinance 12-12-20-001 § 5 (Dec. 20, 2012); see also Knick 
v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019). 
 61. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2168–69; Knick v. Township of Scott, 2016 WL 4701549, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 7, 2016). 
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pleadings, the federal district court dismissed the action because Knick 
had not exhausted her state law remedies under Williamson County’s 
state procedures requirement.69 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.70  The 
court concluded that Knick lacked Article III standing to assert a facial 
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim because she did not 
appeal the district court’s ruling that the ordinance, as applied to her, 
was lawful because the search was of an open field, and thus not 
protected.71  She thus “accepted the District Court’s conclusion that 
her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.”72  Therefore, even 
if she was injured by the inspector’s actions, her Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated.  Even if a court were to enjoin the Township 
from unconstitutionally enforcing the ordinance, it could still search an 
open field (with or without the ordinance).  Although the opinion 
“recognize[d] that the Ordinance’s inspection provision ‘is 
constitutionally suspect and we encourage the [Township] to abandon 
it (or, at least, to modify it substantially),’” the court held that it needed 
a plaintiff with standing in order to consider the argument.73 
Ms. Knick fared no better with her claim for just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment.  The court concluded she had not sought 
compensation via available Pennsylvania law avenues and rejected 
each of her three arguments that she did not need to pursue just 
compensation in Pennsylvania courts.  First, the court concluded that a 
facial takings claim is not exempt from the state-procedures prong of 
Williamson County.74  Second, the court rejected Knick’s argument 
that her earlier state court lawsuit was enough to comply with the 
requirement to pursue compensation in state court.75  That case, 
however, was not a claim for just compensation, only for injunctive 
relief, so the court held the state had not yet denied her 
compensation.76  Finally, the court applied Williamson County and 
held the federal takings claim was not ripe because Knick had not 
sought and been denied compensation in Pennsylvania’s courts.77  Yes, 
 
 69. Id. at 2169. 
 70. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 71. Id. at 317. 
 72. Id. at 318. 
 73. Id. at 322. 
 74. Id. at 323. The Third Circuit had already held otherwise in County Concrete 
Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006), and “[w]e cannot overrule our 
own precedent.” Knick, 862 F.3d at 323. 
 75. Id. at 323–24. 
 76. Id. at 326. 
 77. Id. 
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it is an optional (“prudential”) doctrine the court recognized, but the 
facts here did not suggest that it would be unfair to require Ms. Knick 
to go back to state court and try and obtain compensation.78  The Third 
Circuit distinguished decisions from other circuits which declined to 
apply Williamson County, concluding that “there is ‘value in forcing a 
second trip’ to state court here.”79  The Supreme Court agreed to 
consider the case, which expressly asked the Court to revisit and 
overrule Williamson County’s state litigation requirement.80 
B. The Knick Majority: “That’s Some Catch, That Catch-22”81 
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions issued by a 
sharply divided Supreme Court employed a plethora of very evocative 
language: “aborning,”82 “[c]atch-22,”83 “loot,”84 “shaky,”85 “this ‘sue 
me’ approach to the Takings Clause,”86 “overthrows,”87 “ a mountain 
of precedent,”88 “smashes a hundred-plus years of legal rulings to 
smithereens,”89 “first crack,”90 and “points for creativity.”91  
Ultimately, the most important word from the case was “overruled,” 
because the Court did just that: it expressly eliminated the state 
procedures ripeness requirement.92  Not cut back, not worked around, 
not questioned.  Overruled.  It is enough that the regulation takes 
property, and the government has not already paid the owner 
compensation, and property owners have no obligation to ripen a 
federal takings claims by suing the local government for compensation 
in a state court.  The federal courthouse doors are open once again to 
 
 78. Id. at 328. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019) (No. 17-647) (“Whether the Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–96 
(1985), requiring property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen federal 
takings claims, as suggested by Justices of this Court?”). 
 81. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH–22 57 (6th ed. 1976). 
 82. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2172. 
 85. Id. at 2178. 
 86. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2185. 
 92. Id. at 2179 (“The state-litigation requirement of Williamson County is 
overruled.”). 
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property owners seeking to vindicate their federal constitutional claims 
for compensation for municipal government overregulation of their 
property.93 
The majority opinion began by laying out the one-two punch of 
Williamson County and San Remo: “The takings plaintiff thus finds 
himself in a Catch-22: He cannot go to federal court without going to 
state court first; but if he goes to state court and loses, his claim will be 
barred in federal court.  The federal claim dies aborning.”94 
Then, importantly, the Court defined when a takings claim ripens, 
and in doing so, defined what a “taking” looks like: “We now conclude 
that the state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden 
on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings 
jurisprudence, and must be overruled.  A property owner has an 
actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes 
his property without paying for it.”95 
To be sure, the Court expressly overruling the state-litigation 
ripeness requirement is important.  But, the more critical part of this 
statement is “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence,” 
because it signals that Knick reveals more about substantive takings 
doctrine than it does about the intricacies of federal procedure.96  By 
defining the takings cause of action as ripe when the regulation applies 
to the property and compensation has not been provided, the Court 
emphasized that timing is everything. 
The majority also summarized the biggest analytical hurdle, 
Williamson County’s rationale which was purportedly based on the 
text of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation”), and acknowledged that the 
Fifth Amendment does not require payment contemporaneous with 
the taking as long as there are procedures in place for the owner “to 
obtain compensation after the fact.”97  The majority highlighted a 
distinction that it would delve into later in the opinion — the difference 
between equitable remedies for takings, and compensation — and 
concluded that a federal court Section 1983 claim is ripe and may be 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 2167. Even if the plaintiff wins in state court, he has no federal claim, 
because by awarding compensation, the state court has, in effect, mooted the federal 
“without just compensation” problem. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2168. 
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filed immediately upon the constitutional violation — “when the 
government takes his property without just compensation[.]”98 
The majority opinion emphasized two main themes.  First, property 
rights should be treated the same as other rights in the Bill of Rights, 
often more honored in the breach than the observance.99  Property, as 
James Ely has reminded, was viewed by the original founders and the 
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment as the “guardian of every other 
right,” and thus should be considered with the same scrutiny as other 
rights by the courts.100 
The second theme employed by the majority was a focus on the text 
of the Fifth Amendment as the key to understanding the substance of 
a regulatory takings claim, which is also the key to when such a claim 
is ripe.101  Of course, the issue before the Court might have been 
answered very simply: a municipality has taken property “without 
compensation” when it applies a regulation to property, and the 
regulation itself does not acknowledge the obligation to provide 
compensation.  The government claims it is merely regulating — not 
taking — and, therefore, it does not believe that it is obligated to 
provide compensation.  That notion seems to be built into the concept 
of regulatory takings where it is the exercise of some power other than 
eminent domain, which is claimed by the property owner to have taken 
property.  Instead, the Knick majority responded directly to the core 
logic of Williamson County by focusing instead on a more difficult 
question: 
The Clause provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”  It does not say: “Nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without an available procedure that 
will result in compensation.”  If a local government takes private 
property without paying for it, the government has violated the Fifth 
Amendment — just as the Takings Clause says — without regard to 
subsequent state court proceedings.102 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 2169 (“The state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause 
‘to the status of poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.” (quoting 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994))); see also United States v. James 
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (“Individual freedom finds tangible 
expression in property rights.”). 
 100. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008). 
 101. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The United States, by 
contrast, urges us not to enforce the Takings Clause as written.”). 
 102. Id. at 2170. 
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Interestingly, the majority noted that it does not matter for purposes 
of defining the constitutional violation, whether it is eminent domain 
or some other governmental power being exercised, and “[t]he form of 
the remedy d[oes] not qualify the right.”103  Having recognized that the 
Constitution itself mandates when a taking occurs, the majority used 
this line of thought to attack Williamson County’s rationale.104  The 
obligation to pay compensation when property is taken is “self-
executing,” and “automatically arises at the time the government takes 
property without paying for it.”105  Thus, post-violation compensation 
is a remedy, not an element of a claim.  The Court also recognized the 
distinction between “without just compensation” as an element of a 
takings claim (Williamson County’s core textual rationale), and just 
compensation as the most frequently-sought remedy for a regulatory 
taking: “A later payment of compensation may remedy the 
constitutional violation that occurred at the time of the taking, but that 
does not mean the violation never took place.  The violation is the only 
reason compensation was owed in the first place.”106 
As the majority opinion memorably put it, “[a] bank robber might 
give the loot back, but he still robbed the bank.”107  Thus, the right to 
compensation “arises at the time of the taking, regardless of post-
taking remedies that may be available to the property owner.”108  The 
Court relied on the case which requires that interest owed on a 
compensation award runs from the time of the taking, and includes 
both takings situations: affirmative exercises of the condemnation 
power, and inverse condemnations.109  Section 1983 recognizes a cause 
of action for a “deprivation” of a right “secured by the Constitution,” 
and a “property owner may sue the government at that time in federal 
court,” because that is when the deprivation of Fifth Amendment 
rights occurs.110 
 
 103. Id. (“Jacobs made clear that, no matter what sort of procedures the government 
puts in place to remedy a taking, a property owner has the Fifth Amendment 
entitlement to compensation as soon as the government takes his property without 
paying for it.” (emphasis added) (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933))). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2171. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2172. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16–17. Of course, this is not technically “interest” at all, 
but, more accurately, just compensation in the form of the time value of money. 
However, everyone refers to it as interest, so this Article will as well. 
 110. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)). 
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The majority next addressed the biggest conceptual hurdle that Ms. 
Knick had to overcome: the idea that the Takings Clause “does not 
provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance 
of the occupancy of the land to be taken.”111  One might say that a large 
part of current eminent domain practice is built on the notion, first 
expressed in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., that 
takings are valid even if the condemner does not immediately provide 
just compensation, but only if the owner has a vested right to obtain it 
in the future, including compensation for the delay in payment.112  
Governments can, and often do, acquire or take property in multiple 
ways, including “quick-take,” and in many of these situations, the 
compensation is paid post-taking.113  As the courts have phrased it, 
there must be a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” means to obtain 
compensation for a taking to be valid.114  The Knick Court was keenly 
aware that any ruling would need to avoid radically upsetting these 
existing processes.115  The majority distinguished Cherokee Nation by 
focusing on the remedy sought in that case: an injunction to stop the 
taking (not compensation): “Simply because the property owner was 
not entitled to injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean 
there was no violation of the Takings Clause at that time.”116 
The majority also distinguished Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., a case 
in which the Court held that a property owner asserting a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim against the federal government must seek 
compensation under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.117  
Until she does so, the owner “has no claim against the Government” 
for a taking.118  The majority concluded that the case must be read 
narrowly because the remedy the plaintiff sought was to enjoin the 
allegedly offending regulation.119  Applying the maxim that law comes 
before equity, the Court noted that Ruckelshaus only should be read 
to preclude equitable relief (injunction) when there is a legal remedy 
(compensation), not that an owner has no takings claim until after a 
 
 111. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2175. 
 112. 135 U.S. 641, 659–61 (1890). 
 113. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984). 
 114. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659. 
 115. See Kirby, 467 U.S. at 3–5 (detailing at least three different ways in which the 
federal government affirmatively takes property and provides compensation). 
 116. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2175. 
 117. 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984). 
 118. Id. at 1018 n.21. 
 119. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177–78. 
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Tucker Act claim is rejected.120  In short, according to the majority, 
there was a huge difference between trying to stop an exercise of the 
eminent domain power or application of a regulation because 
compensation has not already been provided, and a claim to recover 
compensation once the property has been taken (either affirmatively 
or by regulation). 
Finally, the Court noted the practicalities.  The Williamson 
County/San Remo combination was “unworkable in practice,”121 and 
the sky will not fall because of the new Knick rule, as it merely opens 
the door to an alternative tribunal: 
Our holding that uncompensated takings violate the Fifth 
Amendment will not expose governments to new liability; it will 
simply allow into federal court takings claims that otherwise would 
have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in state court. 
Governments need not fear that our holding will lead federal courts 
to invalidate their regulations as unconstitutional.  As long as just 
compensation remedies are available — as they have been for nearly 
150 years — injunctive relief will be foreclosed.  For the same reason, 
the Federal Government need not worry that courts will set aside 
agency actions as unconstitutional under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.  Federal courts will not invalidate an otherwise 
lawful uncompensated taking when the property owner can receive 
complete relief through a Fifth Amendment claim brought under the 
Tucker Act.122 
Justice Thomas issued a short concurring opinion, also noting that 
he “join[ed] in full” the majority: 
This “sue me” approach to the Takings Clause is untenable.  The Fifth 
Amendment does not merely provide a damages remedy to a 
property owner willing to “shoulder the burden of securing 
compensation” after the government takes property without paying 
for it.  Instead, it makes just compensation a “prerequisite” to the 
government’s authority to “tak[e] property for public use.”  A 
 
 120. Id. at 2173 (“Equitable relief was not available because monetary relief was 
under the Tucker Act.”). 
 121. Id. at 2178. 
 122. Id. at 2179 (citation omitted). In Knick, the remedy sought was just 
compensation — money. And the defendant was a local municipal government. Thus, 
it was an easy question whether the case could proceed in federal court. That leaves 
unresolved the question: What about when the remedy sought is not compensation, 
and the defendant who is alleged to have affected the taking is a state official — not a 
municipality? When state officials who are alleged to have taken property without 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments assert immunity 
to damage remedies under the Eleventh Amendment, the remedies available to a 
property owner for the taking should include declaratory and injunctive relief. 
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“purported exercise of the eminent-domain power” is therefore 
“invalid” unless the government “pays just compensation before or at 
the time of its taking.”123 
With Williamson County’s state procedures ripeness requirement 
now gone — if only by a one-justice margin — what does this mean for 
takings law? 
First, Williamson County itself is not overruled, and the “final 
decision” requirement, which was not challenged in Knick, is still 
operative.124  Thus, in most cases, property owners still need to obtain 
a final decision from the local government or agency about what uses, 
if any, may be made of their property under the allegedly restrictive 
regulation.125  A court will still need to know the remaining uses under 
the allegedly offending regulation before it can determine whether the 
economic impact on the owner of the regulation is so great that it goes 
“too far” and amounts to a taking.126 
Second, the San Remo preclusion trap is gone.  The overruling of 
the state-litigation requirement also implicitly overruled the 
“preclusion trap” Catch-22 from that case.127  A property owner may 
choose to litigate her state law takings or inverse claims in state 
court.128  If she does so, she will likely be barred from later raising a 
federal takings claim.  However, she will no longer be forced to go to 
 
 123. Id. at 2179 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. 
Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016)). I think Justice Thomas wrote separately for several 
reasons. First, Justice Thomas emphasized that the Constitution’s requirements are the 
requirements, and that we have always done it this way, and arguments based on the 
idea that “this might cost too much” are not going to fly with him: “if this requirement 
makes some regulatory programs ‘unworkable in practice,’ then so be it — our role is 
to enforce the Takings Clause as written.” Id. (citation omitted). Strong stuff. Second, 
Justice Thomas apparently does not care for nationwide injunctions, and Knick’s focus 
on the compensation remedy over injunctive relief gave him a chance to ring that bell. 
Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Court’s recognition of a federal takings claim 
that may be raised in federal court does not preclude other similar claims from being 
pursued, including “common-law tort claims, such as trespass.” 
 124. See id. at 2169 (“Knick does not question the validity of this finality 
requirement, which is not at issue here.”). 
 125. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186–87 (1985); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981). 
 126. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 190–91 (holding the economic impact of 
regulation “simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at 
a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the 
particular land in question”). 
 127. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (the majority noted, “[t]he San Remo preclusion 
trap should tip us off that the state-litigation requirement rests on a mistaken view of 
the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 128. See id. 
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state court in the first instance and raise a state law inverse 
condemnation claim, only to be later told she thereby litigated the 
federal takings claim by implication.  Property owners again have the 
choice of a state or federal forum, as plaintiffs asserting their 
constitutional rights have in every other situation.129  As do municipal 
and state defendants, at least in part, because they may still remove a 
takings lawsuit filed in state court to federal court if the suit includes a 
federal takings claim.  But the shenanigans which surrounded the 
International College remove-and-dismiss game, as well as the 
doctrinal imbalance of letting defendants choose a federal forum while 
denying plaintiffs that same choice, are over. 
Third, Knick reemphasized the usual remedy for regulatory takings 
claims: show me the money.130  The usual cause of action in cases 
against municipal and local government defendants is under the Civil 
Rights Act and Section 1983, seeking compensation.  Property owners 
are not going to get the federal courts to enjoin an uncompensated 
regulatory taking or declare a statute or regulation unconstitutional for 
violating the Takings Clause unless, for some reason, no compensation 
is available.131  For example, what if the defendant is a state, and 
recovering compensation is barred in federal court by the Eleventh 
Amendment?  If you are prohibited from your legal remedy of 
compensation, may you ask for an injunction under Ex parte Young?132 
Fourth, with the “too early” ripeness requirement now somewhat 
defanged, look for a revival of “too late” arguments such as statutes of 
limitations.  One court has already picked up the mantle, asserting that 
Knick’s holding about when a taking occurs means that the statute of 
limitations clock starts ticking from the moment a regulation applies to 
a property owner, even if the owner did not realize that it had.133 
 
 129. Leone v. County of Maui, 404 P.3d 1257 (Haw. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
917 (2019), is a good example of why federal court jurisdiction for federal takings 
claims is important. There, because of Williamson County, a wealthy property owner 
was forced to ask a county jury to decide whether he was entitled to compensation for 
the county’s deprivation of a very expensive beachfront property of all uses. The local 
jury, unsurprisingly, said no. Would the outcome have been different had the jury been 
selected from the federal district’s pool, and not merely the from the defendant’s 
locale? Unknown, of course. But the property owner would have at least liked to have 
that choice. 
 130. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 131. Id. at 2168. 
 132. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Also, under Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 
513 (2013), a property owner may raise a takings defense to the imposition of a 
regulation or statute, on the grounds that subjecting the owner to the statute’s 
requirements would result in an uncompensated taking. 
 133. See Campbell v. United States, 932 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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Finally, the Knick majority took great care to preserve the existing 
system of regulatory or inverse claims against the federal government, 
where property owners seek compensation for relatively small takings 
in district courts, and for major compensation, in the Article I Court of 
Federal Claims.134 
As a result of Knick, the federal judiciary’s unnecessary thirty-year 
abandonment of property and takings cases involving municipal and 
local governments is at long last over.  The Court rightly relegated to 
history’s dustbin a judicially created doctrine that deprived property 
owners of a federal court forum to resolve federal constitutional claims.  
The decades of damage that Williamson County’s state procedures 
requirement wrought on property owners cannot be retroactively 
undone, of course.  However, by putting property rights back on equal 
footing with other constitutional rights, Knick was a big step in the right 
direction.  The Court rectified an unforced error — a mistake it never 
should have made — and correctly restored property owners’ rights to 
the “full-fledged constitutional status” they should enjoy.135 
C. The Knick Dissent: Chicken Little and Let Sleeping Dogs Lie 
During the first round of oral arguments, Justice Breyer asked 
whether, even if Williamson County was a bad rule, the Court should 
“let sleeping dogs lie?” 
JUSTICE BREYER: You don’t have to — the problem — the 
problem — I mean, you could say what Justice Gorsuch said, couldn’t 
you?  The state says: No, we’re not going to pay you.  Ha, because 
there’s no compensation — there’s no taking.  Ha. 
 
In the case of a regulatory taking, however, the taking may occur before the 
effect of the regulatory action is felt and actual damage to the property 
interest is entirely determinable. As the Supreme Court recently stated in a 
regulatory takings case, “a property owner has a claim for a violation of the 
Takings Clause as soon as [the] government takes his property for public use 
without paying for it” without regard to post-taking remedies that may be 
available. In other words, “because a taking without compensation violates 
the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking, the property 
owner can bring a federal suit at that time.” 
Id. (quoting Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170). 
 134. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179. 
 135. See id. at 2170, 2174 (noting that Williamson County could have been decided 
on the basis that the property owner had not obtained a final decision from the agency, 
and it was unnecessary for the Court to adopt the state procedures requirement). 
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And we could say that’s a final decision not to take it.  We could.  I 
mean, I don’t see any logic.  But Williamson didn’t.  So I thought: 
Well, why let the sleeping dog — let it lie?136 
The idea that repose is more important than getting it right turned 
out to be a key point of departure for the four dissenters, who revealed 
several fundamental disconnects with the majority about takings 
law.137  Interestingly, the dissenters did not merely hold their figurative 
noses to let the state procedures dog lie because it had been around for 
thirty-plus years, but instead doubled down on its rationale.  Justice 
Kagan’s dissent was the full-throated explication of Williamson County 
that the Court in Williamson County itself never made: the state 
procedures rationale was not merely long-standing law, it was 
correct.138 
The first fundamental disconnect with the majority about takings 
law was that the dissenters rejected the majority’s view that property 
rights should be treated the same as other rights recognized under the 
Bill of Rights.  Instead, they viewed the Takings Clause as “unique 
among the Bill of Rights’ guarantees.”139  To the dissenters, this is a 
textual argument (harking back to Williamson County) because, in 
their view, there is no constitutional violation unless and until “the 
government” denies compensation.140  The dissent focuses on the long-
standing rules which do not require payment of compensation before 
or at the time of an affirmative taking by eminent domain.141  Cherokee 
Nation rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment requires advance 
payment, as long as “reasonable, certain, and adequate” post-taking 
compensation is available.142  To the dissenters, a state law inverse 
condemnation action in state court qualifies as a vested promise to pay, 
if there has been a taking.143  Williamson County merely reflected how 
the Takings Clause works in regulatory takings cases: the same way it 
works in eminent domain (according to the dissent).  Thus, the logic 
goes, a state court inverse claim to recover compensation for the legal 
taking is a prerequisite to a ripe federal cause of action.  This, the 
 
 136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–45, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647). 
 137. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 2186–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So when the government ‘takes and pays,’ it is not 
violating the Constitution at all.”). 
 141. See id. at 2181–86 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 142. See Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890) (“[T]he owner 
is entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining . . . the 
compensation to which, under the constitution, he is entitled[.]”). 
 143. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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dissent asserted, is based on “a hundred years” worth of “precedent 
after precedent,”144 “stretching back to the late 1800s.”145  After all, the 
dissenters argued, no one is claiming that federal quick-takes are 
unconstitutional.146  There, property is seized before the adjudication 
and payment of compensation.  Is there not a critical difference 
between an eminent domain quick-take where the government 
occupies now, with the corresponding recognition of the absolute 
obligation of the government to pay whatever the court later 
determines is just compensation, and a regulatory taking where the 
government is exercising some other power, and absolutely denies that 
it needs to pay anything?  “Reasonable, certain, and adequate” 
presumes that the government admits it owes compensation, not 
where, as in inverse and regulatory cases, it asserts it was merely 
regulating, and thus owes nothing for exercising that power. 
The second fundamental split between the majority and the dissent 
was on the practical consequences of the decision.  In contrast to the 
majority, which focused on the impacts the state procedures 
requirement has had on property owners, the dissent focused instead 
on regulators: “The majority’s overruling of Williamson County will 
have two damaging consequences.  It will inevitably turn even well-
meaning government officials into lawbreakers.  And it will subvert 
important principles of judicial federalism.  To begin with, today’s 
decision means that government regulators will often have no way to 
avoid violating the Constitution.”147 
As Justice Gorsuch recently wrote in another case, “Really?”148  
Government regulators are in no worse off position after Knick on the 
merits of takings questions than they were before, and are no more 
“lawbreakers” today than in the past thirty years.149  The only major 
difference is that as a consequence of Knick, they may now have to 
answer to a federal judge and not a state judge, and cannot employ 
Williamson County’s state procedures requirement.  The bar that 
property owners must cross in order to prove a regulation actually 
 
 144. Id. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 148. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 149. For more thoughts on this, see Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending 
a Catch-22 that Barred Takings Case from Federal Court, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 153, 185 (2019). 
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takes property and requires compensation remains extremely high.150  
This objection was more like chicken nothing than chicken little.151 
D. Stare Decisis and Reverse Percolation 
Perhaps the dissent’s most significant criticism of the majority was 
on the question of the sleeping dog and stare decisis.152  In the last 
section of her dissent, Justice Kagan vigorously argued the Court 
should not overturn Williamson County for all the reasons that a court 
of last resort should not lightly overturn precedent.  This appeared to 
be aimed at a much broader audience than the majority justices, 
property owners, their lawyers, and takings scholars because the stare 
decisis debate is part of a much larger context, framed by other cases.  
Whether it is prudent to go back and revisit existing case decisions and 
rules of law generally is a question this Article shall leave to other 
commentators.  Despite concerns about overturning recent decisions, 
Williamson County was a uniquely bad stare decisis hill to die on, for 
two main reasons. 
First, the state-litigation rule which Williamson County adopted sua 
sponte was the usual “percolation” process in reverse.153  The Solicitor 
General raised the issue (not the parties),154 and the Court simply 
accepted and adopted it without the benefit of party briefing or prior 
deep consideration by the legal academy.155  Consequently, the 
rationale which the Court adopted in Williamson County was too 
 
 150. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 151. In Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012), 
a unanimous Court rejected a similar argument that holding in favor of the property 
owner on compensation would undermine the federal government’s ability to control 
flooding. See id. at 37 (“We have rejected this argument when deployed to urge blanket 
exemptions from the Fifth Amendment’s instruction. While we recognize the 
importance of the public interests the Government advances in this case, we do not see 
them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings 
Clause cases. The sky did not fall after [United States v.] Causby [, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)], 
and today’s modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.”); see also Somin, 
supra note 149, at 185 (“However, it is far from clear that Knick presages a major 
revolution in favor of stronger protection for constitutional property rights under the 
Takings Clause.”). 
 152. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Everything said above 
aside, Williamson County should stay on the books because of stare decisis.”). 
 153. See id. at 2174. 
 154. See id. 
 155. The majority responded to the dissent’s outrage that by overruling Williamson 
County, the majority was creating a stare decisis crisis. Noting the avalanche of 
criticisms from all sides of the spectrum, the majority pointed out the doctrine’s “shaky 
foundations” and slow erosion from a seemingly mandatory jurisdictional rule to an 
optional prudential one. Id. at 2178. 
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clever by half, and a self-inflicted wound.  Nor was the validity and 
application of the doctrine ever tested or argued directly in the Court 
in the intervening decades, with a small exception of 2005’s San Remo 
v. City and County of San Francisco.156  However, even in that case, the 
arguments were more focused on preclusion and full faith and credit, 
and why Williamson County did not control, not why it was 
fundamentally wrong.157  The petitioner avoided expressly asking to 
overrule Williamson County.158 
That leads to the second reason that Williamson County should rank 
low in the hierarchy of stare decisis precedents.  The last 30-plus years 
of experience starkly revealed that the theory did not work in practice.  
What value was there in retaining a procedure that led to such 
overwhelming real-world problems?  Even the rule’s supporters, as the 
majority pointed out, did not strenuously defend it for the reasons it 
was adopted.159  In Knick, the Township did not vigorously defend 
Williamson County under the same analysis by which the Court 
originally adopted the rule.  Instead, it couched its arguments mainly 
in terms of federal jurisdiction and Section 1983.160  This was not 
exactly a resounding endorsement of Williamson County’s rationale.  
Thus, the dissent’s objections on stare decisis grounds are really more 
of a howl of protest about the doctrine in other cases, not this one, 
which did not deserve deference simply by the passage of time. 
III. DISCOVERING KNICK’S HOME RULE RATIONALE 
Part III argues that the Knick opinions are best understood in light 
of the unstated assumptions that each held about the nature of the 
relationship between municipal governments and state courts.  This 
Part further suggests that Knick was based on a separation of powers 
between local governments and state judiciaries. 
The most fundamental disconnect between the Knick majority and 
the dissent was, interestingly, not expressly set out in either opinion.  
Yet it underlies the competing rationales.  The core of this sublimated 
dispute was whether a state law inverse condemnation claim, resolved 
 
 156. 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 157. Id. at 337–38. 
 158. See generally id. The lesson from the San Remo arguments was not lost on 
property owners and their counsel. By the time Ms. Knick filed her petition, several 
had already asked the Court directly to overturn Williamson County. See, e.g., 
Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016). 
 159. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174–75. 
 160. See Brief for Respondents at 28–34, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647) (“A 
plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution.”). 
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by a state court, was part-and-parcel of a local government’s taking and 
compensation process.161  Put another way, is the availability of a state 
court lawsuit the functional equivalent of a local government’s promise 
to pay for a taking? 
The majority concluded no: “A property owner has an actionable 
Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his 
property without paying for it.”162  The majority assumed that when a 
municipal government is doing the taking, state law making a state 
court inverse condemnation lawsuit available was not “the [same] 
government” doing the compensating.  Thus, to the majority, the 
availability of after-the-taking compensation in state court by way of a 
state law inverse condemnation claim was completely irrelevant to the 
question of whether the taking was accomplished “without just 
compensation” by the local government.163 
The dissent, by contrast, had a completely different view on the 
matter.  Although the dissenters reached the opposite conclusion on 
that question, Justice Kagan’s opinion at least regarded the inquiry 
similarly: whether “the government” promises to pay compensation 
when state law makes available a state court inverse condemnation 
claim. 
Begin with the basics — the meaning of the Takings Clause.  The right 
that the Clause confers is not to be free from government takings of 
property for public purposes.  Instead, the right is to be free from 
those takings when the government fails to provide ‘just 
compensation.’  In other words, the government can take private 
property for public purposes, so long as it fairly pays the property 
owner.164 
The dissenters viewed state courts as part-and-parcel of the local 
government’s compensation mechanism, not truly separate branches of 
state governments.165  The answer was obvious, and nothing more than 
what follows from a reading of the Takings Clause “as night the day.”166  
So obvious that the dissent did not address its assumption that local 
governments and state courts are, collectively, “the government,” 
 
 161. See, e.g., Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that state 
court inverse condemnation claim is the equivalent of a Tucker Act claim for 
compensation). 
 162. Id. at 2167 (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 2177. 
 164. Id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphases added and in original). 
 165. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Put another way, a Takings Clause violation has 
two necessary elements. First, the government must take the property. Second, it must 
deny the property owner compensation.” (emphasis added)). 
 166. Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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except with an unsupported assertion that “[t]he Tucker Act is the 
Federal Government’s equivalent of a State’s inverse condemnation 
procedure, by which a property owner can obtain just 
compensation.”167 
However, when state courts adjudicate a state law inverse 
condemnation claim, they are not acting as an arm of local government.  
Instead, state courts are simply doing what courts do: resolving a 
controversy.168  The dissent’s assumption that state courts are tasked 
with authority to provide compensation when local governments take 
property is based on an outmoded view of local governments as legally 
indistinguishable from the state because local governments are mere 
administrative conveniences and do not possess any distinct or 
independent authority.169  This is the storied “Dillon Rule.”  However, 
this is a decidedly minority view today, and the overwhelming 
approach to a state’s relationship with its political subdivisions can be 
characterized as either the “Cooley rule,”170 or “home rule.”171  Under 
 
 167. Id. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 168. See Brian P. Keenan, Note, Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause: 
Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State Under Federal Law?, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1899, 1900 (2005) (“[Local governments] offer a miniature version of federalism 
on the state level, dividing the power of the state and placing many important decisions 
in the hands of representatives closer to the people.”). 
 169. See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 
(1868) (Dillon, C.J.); 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, 
at 174 (2d ed. 1873); see also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923) 
(“The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held and used for ‘governmental 
purposes’ cannot be questioned.”); Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A 
New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 390 (2012) (noting that 
“[m]unicipalities were held to be creatures of the state, having no rights beyond those 
given to them by the state that created them”) (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161 (1907)). 
 170. In People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871) (Cooley, J., 
concurring), Justice Thomas Cooley, responding to the Dillon Rule, wrote:  
The state may mould [sic] local institutions according to its views of policy or 
expediency; but local government is matter of absolute right; and the state 
cannot take it away. It would be the boldest mockery to speak of a city as 
possessing municipal liberty where the state not only shaped its government, 
but at discretion sent in its own agents to administer it; or to call that system 
one of constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible to 
allow the people full control in their local affairs, or no control at all. 
Id. 
 171. JEFFERSON FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL 
HOME RULE (1953). Forty-eight states have “home rule” legislation or constitutional 
provisions. Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at 
Home Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 268 (2013) (citing RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE 
REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 268 (6th ed. 2004)). 
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this approach, in areas of local interest, municipalities have the power 
to act without the state’s approval, and in some instances, a locality’s 
law may be superior to conflicting state law.172  Even though the 
Supreme Court endorsed the Dillon Rule in Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh,173 the Court subsequently recognized that states’ usual 
broad powers over political subdivisions are limited when important 
federal constitutional rights are at issue.174  Thus, even in a Dillon Rule 
jurisdiction, the federal interest in ensuring just compensation for 
actions which effect a taking should count more than a state’s interest 
in exercising detailed control over its political subdivisions.  This is the 
more enlightened view of the place of municipalities within the federal-
state-local government vertical separation of governmental powers and 
responsibilities.175  The Knick majority’s implicit recognition of the 
separation between local governments and state judiciaries should be 
considered an affirmation of the modern view of state-municipal 
relations.176 
 
 172. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“Each political subdivision shall have the 
power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits and 
under such procedures as may be provided by general law. Such procedures, however, 
shall not require the approval of a charter by a legislative body. Charter provisions with 
respect to a political subdivision’s executive, legislative and administrative structure 
and organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of 
the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and 
functions.”). 
 173. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
 174. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 
(1994) (federal interest in avoiding the establishment of religion); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (federal interest in race-neutral municipal 
boundaries); Keenan, supra note 168, at 1902 n.15 (citing Grumet, 512 U.S. 687) (“The 
state’s power over its political subdivisions is therefore not completely unlimited.”). 
 175. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 179–80; Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 560 (Pa. 
1933); Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have Constitutional 
Rights?: Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against 
the State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93, 94 n.6 (2002) (“In addition, other state and federal cases 
bolster the proposition that states’ power over their municipal corporations is limited 
in some respects by the Constitution.” (citing Atlanta Coast Demolition & Recycling, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 893 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.J. 1995))). 
 176. Two additional rules emphasize the difference between local governments and 
states. First, unlike states, local governments and other creatures of state law are not 
immune under the Eleventh Amendment from being sued in the federal courts without 
their consent. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (the amendment is a form 
of sovereign immunity). Second, local governments and municipal corporations are 
“persons” under the statutory vehicle most often employed to raise federal 
constitutional claims, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 683 (1978) (“An examination of the debate on § 1 
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Thus, when the dissent asserted, “[t]he Takings Clause is different 
because it does not prohibit takings; to the contrary, it permits them 
provided the government gives just compensation.  So when the 
government ‘takes and pays,’ it is not violating the Constitution at all,” 
one can see how it conflates the municipal government defendant and 
the state judiciary into “the government.”177  But in Knick, the 
Township has not “taken and paid,” and the Township had not 
provided an implied promise to pay if indeed it took property.  Indeed, 
the only reason a property owner needs to sue “the government” is that 
“the government” has refused to pay.  Rather, the local government 
has taken, and the state judiciary may have eventually ordered it to 
pay.  One of the theories of federal separation of powers is premised 
on the idea that every governmental action may be classified as 
legislative, executive, or judicial.178  When a state court adjudicates a 
state law taking or inverse condemnation claim, it is plainly acting in its 
judicial capacity. 
The following passage best reveals the dissent’s false assumption: 
“The majority today holds, in conflict with precedent after precedent, 
that a government violates the Constitution whenever it takes property 
without advance compensation — no matter how good its commitment 
to pay.”179 
What “commitment to pay” has a local government made if all it 
says to property owners who say that their property has been taken by 
regulation is “sue me” in state court?180  None.  The availability of a 
state court action for inverse condemnation under state law is not any 
kind of recognition by the local government that it may be liable for a 
taking at all.  It is simply an available avenue to adjudicate whether a 
local government may be liable for a taking under state law.  The Knick 
majority’s unstated assumption is that state judges and state courts are 
much like their federal counterparts — the deciders.  Indeed, even 
judges on the most “local” of courts view themselves as adjudicators, 
separate from their local governments.181 
 
[of the Civil Rights Act] and application of appropriate rules of construction show 
unequivocally that § 1 was intended to cover legal, as well as natural, persons.”). 
 177. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 178. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: 
Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 659 (2011) (citing Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734–35 (1996)). 
 179. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 180. Hat tip to Justice Thomas. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 181. See Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Governments, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 707, 715–16 (2015) (“At the most local level, judges maintain a strong 
sense of separation of powers, that tends to isolate local judges from other local 
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Illustrating the distinction is the Knick dissent’s reliance on an 
analogy to federal Tucker Act claims for compensation in the Court of 
Federal Claims, and the majority opinion’s rejection of that analogy.  
The dissenters asked why a state court inverse condemnation lawsuit 
seeking compensation is not the very same thing as a Tucker Act claim 
for compensation, a process the majority did not disturb: 
Fourth and finally, the majority lays claim to another line of decisions 
— involving the Tucker Act — but with no greater success.  The 
Tucker Act waives the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity 
and grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits seeking 
compensation for takings.  According to the majority, this Court’s 
cases establish that such an action “is a claim for a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment” — that is, for a constitutional offense that has 
already happened because of the absence of advance payment.  But 
again, the precedents say the opposite.  The Tucker Act is the Federal 
Government’s equivalent of a State’s inverse condemnation 
procedure, by which a property owner can obtain just compensation.  
The former, no less than the latter, forestalls any constitutional 
violation by ensuring that an owner gets full and fair payment for a 
taking.182 
The majority opinion pointed to the same Tucker Act process, but 
reached a completely different conclusion about its meaning: 
We have long recognized that property owners may bring Fifth 
Amendment claims against the Federal Government as soon as their 
property has been taken.  The Tucker Act, which provides the 
standard procedure for bringing such claims, gives the Court of 
Federal Claims jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim 
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution” or 
any federal law or contract for damages “in cases not sounding in 
tort.”  We have held that “[i]f there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded 
upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims to hear and determine.”183 
Were the Court of Federal Claims an Article III court, the dissenters 
might have had a better point in asserting that it is the same as state 
 
officials in the legislature and the executive. At the less-than-local county level, 
however, it seems that collaboration is more likely to occur as sister government 
branches work together to effectuate policy.”) (footnote omitted); see also Paul J. De 
Muniz, Oregon Courts Today and Tomorrow, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 291, 292 (2014) 
(describing how the Oregon state court system evolved into a unified statewide system 
“shifting fiscal responsibility for the judiciary away from the local governments and 
placing it almost entirely with the state”). 
 182. Knick, 139 S. Ct.  at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 183. Id. at 2170 (citations omitted). 
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general jurisdiction courts.  But the Court of Federal Claims is an 
Article I legislative tribunal, different in kind than an Article III 
court.184  Despite being labeled a “court,” and its members “judges,” 
the Court of Federal Claims in substance serves much the same 
function as Congress itself did in the days when claims for 
compensation were submitted as special bills: to determine whether the 
legislature must pay compensation.185  Thus, most critically for the 
Knick analysis, by creating the Court of Federal Claims: 
Congress did not create the Court of Federal Claims as an 
independent “constitutional” court pursuant to Article III of the 
constitution.  Instead, Congress explicitly provided, when creating it, 
that the new Court of Federal Claims is a “legislative court,” created 
pursuant to Article I.  The distinction is one with a profound 
difference.186 
The division of power between local governments, on the one hand, 
and state courts, on the other, differs from both types of federal takings 
— eminent domain takings, and regulatory takings or inverse 
condemnations by the federal government — in two ways.  First, in 
federal eminent domain takings, the federal government has 
acknowledged its obligation to pay compensation if it decides to 
acquire the property at the adjudicated prices, and the owner’s right to 
compensation vests when title transfers from owner to the federal 
 
 184. See Brott v. United States, 858 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2017) (the Court of 
Federal Claims, an Article I tribunal, has exclusive jurisdiction to consider takings 
claims which seek in excess of $10,000 in compensation), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 
(2018). 
 185. The judges of the Court of Federal Claims do not enjoy the same protections 
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Court of Federal Claims are not entitled to have the case considered by a jury. 28 
U.S.C. § 1491 (2011); see also Michael P. Goodman, Taking Back Takings Claims: Why 
Congress Giving Just Compensation Jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims is 
Unconstitutional, 60 VILL. L. REV. 101, 104 (2015) (“The Court of Federal Claims is 
not entirely like the federal district courts, however . . . there are important differences 
between the Court of Federal Claims and the federal district courts.”). 
 186. Goodman, supra note 185, at 86 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1992)). Whether 
Congress’ assignment of major just compensation claims to an Article I tribunal 
comports with the ideas that the right to compensation is “self-executing” and should 
therefore not need a waiver of sovereign immunity, and that the calculation of 
compensation is an “inherently judicial” function, see Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893), is beyond the scope of this Article. For our 
purposes here, suffice it to note that challenges to the Court of Federal Claims’ 
exclusive jurisdiction over these claims have not met with a receptive audience. See, 
e.g., Brott, 858 F.3d at 429, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 (2018); TrinCo Inv. Co. v. 
United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 530 (2018). 
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government.  Second, in federal regulatory takings, the federal 
government itself has created a legislative forum where property 
owners who assert that an action by the government has affected a 
taking may seek compensation.  Thus, the role of the Court of Federal 
Claims and state courts are dramatically different.  In a federal taking, 
the federal government is both doing the (alleged) taking, and, via the 
Court of Federal claims, has offered up a “reasonable, certain, and 
adequate” means for obtaining post-hoc compensation.  Not so in 
regulatory takings by local governments.  In short, the more sensible 
understanding is that once “the [municipal] government” (allegedly) 
takes property, all the owner need do to ripen a claim is ask “the 
government” (the same government) to pay up, and it does not need 
to ask a separate branch of the state to force the municipality to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
In the nearly 100 years since Justice Holmes famously opined in 
Mahon that if a regulation goes “too far” it will be recognized as a 
taking without just compensation, the Court has made clear that a 
regulation is a taking when it either forces an owner to surrender even 
a small part of her right to exclude, or deprives the owner of 
“productive use” of property.  In Knick, we now have the first case in 
the modern takings oeuvre in which the Court expresses clearly what 
the second part of a cause of action — “without just compensation” — 
looks like. 
At long last, a majority of the Court appears to understand that a 
federal takings claim against a local or municipal government is ripe 
for adjudication if the government has not acknowledged its obligation 
to provide compensation.  Because the government’s obligation is 
“self-executing,” the claim arises now and the owner may pursue a 
federal compensation remedy now, either in state or federal court.  
Pursuing and losing a state law inverse condemnation claim is not an 
element of a federal takings claim. 
